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Abstract
Prior research suggests that young children selectively inform others depending on others’
knowledge states. Yet, little is known whether children selectively inform others depending
on their own knowledge states. To explore this issue, we manipulated 3- to 4-year-old chil-
dren’s knowledge about the content of a box and assessed the impact on their decisions to
inform another person. Moreover, we assessed the presence of uncertainty gestures while
they inform another person in light of the suggestions that children's gestures reflect early
developing, perhaps transient, epistemic sensitivity. Finally, we compared children’s perfor-
mance in the informing context to their explicit verbal judgment of their knowledge states to
further confirm the existence of a performance gap between the two tasks. In their decisions
to inform, children tend to accurately assess their ignorance, whereas they tend to overesti-
mate their own knowledge states when asked to explicitly report them. Moreover, children
display different levels of uncertainty gestures depending on the varying degrees of their
informational access. These findings suggest that children’s implicit awareness of their own
ignorance may be facilitated in a social, communicative context.
Introduction
Understanding one’s own knowledge states is critical for learning as well as for social interac-
tion, including conversation. One such case is when we inform others. We should refrain from
informing others when we do not know as opposed to when we do know. It is not clear, how-
ever, whether children inform others selectively depending on the validity and informative
value of their own knowledge states. Children may be helpful and reliable informants of others,
but they might also be overconfident in their own ability to inform. By drawing on the meta-
cognitive literature, we explored whether children are sensitive to their own ignorance when
they are asked to inform another ignorant person. Below, we review research studies on chil-
dren’s informing and gestures and then turn to a body of research on implicit and explicit
forms of metacognition.
A few research studies suggest that children at an early age selectively inform their conversa-
tional partners depending on their attribution of knowledge states to others [1–2]. Even
12-month-old infants display sensitivity to others’ knowledge states in their informing
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behavior [3]. Thus, children inform an ignorant person rather than a knowledgeable person.
Yet, this line of research has exclusively focused on children’s sensitivity to others’ knowledge
states when informing them. Being an efficient informer, however, also requires sensitivity to
one’s own knowledge state. For example, if we were ignorant about which way to take to the
cinema, it would not be useful to inform a help-seeking stranger on the street by giving him a
direction. Therefore, a full-fledged form of selective informing should rest upon considering
both others’ knowledge states and one’s own.
Although surprisingly little research has addressed this issue, we have good reasons to
assume that already by preschool age children take their own knowledge states into account
when informing others. Toddlers show some nascent awareness of their lack of knowledge in
communication ([4] see also [5, 6]). Moreover, it is often assumed that children’s understand-
ing of others’ and of their own knowledge states are closely related to one another, because the
same conceptual resources should be used in both cases (e.g., [7] but see also [8]). Research
shows, however, that both forms of understanding might crucially depend on nonconceptual
resources. For example, preschoolers’ epistemic sensitivity to what others know or do not
know is modulated by activity-dependent cues such as fluency (i.e., how easy one can process
another person’s communicative message) [9]. Taken together, preschool children’s informing
decisions may be modulated by a sensitivity to their own knowledge states.
A separate domain of research on young children’s metacognitive abilities provides an
insight into whether children are sensitive to their own knowledge states. Studies show that by
4 years of age children accurately report their own knowledge or ignorance when they are
allowed vs. denied full access to relevant perceptual information (e.g.,[10–11]). However, in a
‘partial exposure’ task in which children are shown multiple objects but do not know which
particular object is then hidden in a container, an accurate assessment of their own knowledge
states is a late developmental achievement [12–13]. For example, in a recent study by Rohwer
et al. [13], children were presented with two toys and were told that only one of the toys would
be hidden in a box. After the hiding of one of the toys, children were asked if they did or did
not know the contents of the box. Children younger than 6 years of age tended to overestimate
their knowledge by responding that they knew the hidden object in the box.
Based on their findings, Rowher et al. [13], argue that a fully representational understanding
of the causal origin of one’s own knowledge is not acquired until around the age of 6 years.
Supporting this view, some older studies showed that preschool-aged children often inaccu-
rately reported that they had always known the information they had just learned or misidenti-
fied the specific modality of the senses (seeing vs. touching) required for knowing a certain
piece of knowledge (e.g., [14–15]).
However, metacognition does not necessarily involve explicit awareness of mental and cog-
nitive processes [16–17]. Moreover, using tasks that do not require explicit verbal responses,
recent empirical studies document implicit metacognitive abilities in preschool aged children
and infants [18–22] and even nonhuman animals ([23–24] see [25] for a review). One such
task uses an ‘opt-out’ paradigm in which young children and nonhuman animals are allowed
to skip trials (e.g., [18, 19, 21, 23, 26]). Participants tend to use the option of skipping trials
when they are uncertain about their responses, thereby avoiding inaccurate responses. There-
fore, young children may have an implicit ability to monitor their own mental states without
being able to explicitly verbalize them. In particular, informing decisions—whether to inform
or not—as discussed earlier can be a good index for children’s emerging sensitivity to their
own epistemic (un)certainty.
In addition to children’s informing decisions, their spontaneous gestures might also give
valuable information on their sensitivity to their own knowledge states. Research by Goldin-
Meadow and colleagues has shown that children’s manual or pointing gestures reveal an earlier
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understanding than their verbal judgments (e.g.,[27–28]). For example, in a Piagetian conser-
vation task, children tend to consider only one factor (the height of a glass containing water)
while ignoring another relevant factor (the width of the glass) in their verbal judgments
whereas their gestures indicate they do consider both factors [27]. Thus, the gestures that chil-
dren produce can reveal their early developing implicit- and transitional- knowledge.
Interestingly, adults produce gestures that mark their epistemic stance and these gestures
are perceived by listeners as conveying the epistemic stance of the speaker [29]. Thus, epistemic
gestures seem to be a reliable index of the speakers’ epistemic states in communication. Addi-
tionally, although not as frequent or accurate as adults, 7- and 8-year-old children produce
uncertainty related audio-visual cues (e.g., ‘funny faces,’ fillers, eyebrow movement) and are
able to detect them displayed by others [30]. By implication, young children might spontane-
ously—and perhaps unknowingly—produce uncertainty gestures even if they do not explicitly
mark their uncertainty in their verbal communication.
In the present research, we manipulated children’s epistemic access to the contents of a
box and asked whether 3- and 4-year-old children display sensitivity to their own ignorance
when they are asked to inform another ignorant person. Importantly, by adopting the opt-out
paradigm used in prior studies of metacognitive abilities in nonhuman animals and young chil-
dren (e.g.,[18, 19, 21, 23, 26]), we gave children an option to decline informing. Moreover, in
order to assess whether children’s spontaneous gesture production indicates their varying level
of uncertainty, we also investigated children’s uncertainty gestures. Finally, in order to investi-
gate the gap between explicit and implicit forms of metacognition documented in the prior
studies, in addition to an ‘Informing task’ in which children were asked to inform another per-
son, all children received an ‘Explicit task’. Here, we relied on the task by Rohwer et al. [13] in
which participants were asked to verbally report their knowledge states (see Method section
below). We expected that children would selectively inform others depending on their knowl-
edge states by agreeing to inform others when they are more certain about their knowledge
states. By contrast, children would over-estimate their knowledge states in their explicit verbal
judgments as in Rowher et al. [13]. Given the prior evidence showing that children as young as
3 years old (if not younger) display some early metacognitive abilities (e.g.,[18, 19, 21, 23]) and
that they are good conversational partners (e.g., [4]), we expected that both 3-and 4-year-old
children would show sensitivity to their own ignorance in their informing in the present tasks.
We also explored possible age effects because some prior studies suggest that children’s meta-
cognitive abilities—despite its early presence in development- develop during preschool years
(e.g., [9, 31]).
Method
Participants
Three-year-old (N = 18, Mean age = 42 months 15 days, Range = 38 months 24 days ~ 45
months 6 days, 7 boys, 11 girls) and 4-year-old German children (N = 18, Mean age = 55
months 7 days, Range = 48 months 11 days ~ 56 months 18 days, 10 boys, 8 girls) participated.
Five additional 3-year-old children were tested but excluded from final data analyses (1 child
due to experimenter error; 1 child who inaccurately labeled the toys at the end of the testing; 1
child due to a language delay; 2 children who did not provide any responses throughout the
entire experimental session). Children were largely from middle or upper middle class families.
Parental written consent forms were obtained on behalf of the children. Children were asked if
they would be willing to participate before the testing began and told that they can stop at any
point. This study, including the consent procedure, was approved by the Ethics Board of Lud-
wig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany.
Children's Sensitivity to Own Ignorance
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595 March 29, 2016 3 / 15
Materials
A white partition wall (50  50  1 cm) was used as a screen to restrict children’s view. In the
informing task, two additional white partition walls were used, one between the experimenter
and the child, and the other between another adult and the child. We used a black, opaque
shoebox with a lid as a hiding place for the toys. Two sets of 8 different toys were used for the
two tasks (see Fig 1).
Design and procedure
Children were tested in a laboratory room, seated at a table opposite to the experimenter. Each
child received an “informing task” followed by an “explicit task.” Children also participated in
a short filler activity (watching a movie) between the two tasks (about 5 minutes). For each
task, children completed three conditions (Ignorance, Partial Knowledge, Full Knowledge),
two trials per condition, in a counterbalanced order. The order of the trials in the informing
task was repeated for the explicit task.
Informing task. We adopted a modified procedure from Rohwer and colleagues [13].
Another adult (“Max”) was seated next to the individual child and was present during the
entire informing task session. There were three separate removable screens—one between Max
Fig 1. A photo of toys. Toys used in the experiment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595.g001
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and the child, another between the child and the experimenter, and the third between Max and
the experimenter. Max’s view of the box was blocked (see Fig 2).
In the Ignorance condition, children were not presented with any objects and told that a toy
would be placed in the box (“I’m going to put a toy inside the box”). Then, behind the screen,
the experimenter put a toy in the box, removed the screen, and told the children, “Now I have
put a toy inside the box.” In the Partial Knowledge condition, children were presented with
two different toys and the empty box and told that one of the toys would be placed inside the
box (“I‘m going to put one of these toys inside the box”). After hiding one of the toys in the
box behind the screen and removing the screen, the experimenter told, “Now I have put one of
the toys inside the box.” In the Full Knowledge condition, children were presented with a toy
and the empty box and told that the toy would be placed inside the box (“I’m going to put this
toy inside the box”). After placing the object inside the box, closing the box with a lid, the
experimenter told the children, “Now I have put the toy inside the box.” In all conditions,
instead of being asked to explicitly indicate their own knowledge states as in Rohwer et al. [13],
children were asked if they were willing to inform another ignorant person, “Max wants to
know what’s inside the box. Can you help him? If you do not want to tell him, it’s okay. I can
tell him.” If children agreed to inform, then the experimenter removed the screen between the
child and Max, and said, “Go ahead and tell him.” If children declined to inform, then the
experimenter informed Max after removing the screen between herself and Max, “Okay, I will
tell him. There is a [ball] inside.” Then, the screen was placed back on the table.
Explicit task. The explicit task closely followed the procedure of Rohwer and colleagues
[13]. The procedure was the same as in the informing task except for the following changes.
There was no third person children are asked to inform. In all conditions, children were explic-
itly asked to state their knowledge states, “Do you know what’s inside the box or do you not
know?” In all three conditions, follow-up questions depended on children’s responses. If chil-
dren said that they did not know the content of the box, they were asked, “Why don’t you
know what’s inside the box?” If children said that they did know the content of the box, they
Fig 2. A photo of the informing task. The positions of the experimenter, a child participant, and Max in the informing task.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595.g002
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were asked the following two questions: 1) “Okay, then tell me what’s inside the box?” 2) Do
you really know or are you just guessing?”
At the end of the explicit task, children were asked to label the toys used in the two tasks. All
children were able to label them except for one child whose responses were excluded from the
final data analyses.
We coded the following gestures during the time (about 5 seconds) when children were
asked whether or not they would inform Max in the informing task and whether or not they
knew the contents of the box in the explicit task: tilting the head to one side; shaking the head;
shrugging shoulders; looking away. The experimenter and a second coder (blind to hypotheses)
independently coded all the data. Interrater reliability was 100%.
Results
Children’s informing decision
We first asked whether children’s performance in the informing task reveals sensitivity to their
differing knowledge states across conditions. Thus, we asked whether children’s initial decision
to inform (agreeing vs. declining) varied by their knowledge states. Children were given a score
of 1 if they agreed to inform and a score of 0 if they declined to inform. Fig 3 presents the mean
proportion of trials in which children agreed to inform.
These scores were analyzed by means of a 2 (Age: 3-year-olds vs. 4-year-olds) by 3 (Condi-
tion: Full knowledge, Partial knowledge, Ignorance) repeated ANOVA with Age as a between-
subject factor and Condition as a within-subject factor. There was a significant main effect of
Condition, F (2, 68) = 9.35, p< .001, η2 = .22 (Full knowledge:M = .63 SD = .07; Partial knowl-
edge:M = .47 SD = .08; Ignorance:M = .33 SD = .07). More specifically, children’s decision to
inform decreased in a linear fashion across the three conditions, F (1, 68) = 14.17, p< .01. The
interaction effect was not significant, F (2, 68) = 1.38, nor was the effect of Age, F (1, 34) = 2.10.
Fig 3. Informing decisions. The mean proportion of trials in which children chose to inform (as opposed to
declining to inform). Error bars indicate standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595.g003
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Uncertainty gesture
Next, we asked whether children’s uncertainty gesture production varied with condition and
task type. Fig 4 presents the mean proportion of trials in which an uncertainty gesture was
present.
The data were analyzed by means of a 2 (Age: 3-year-olds vs. 4-year-olds) by 2 (Task type:
informing vs. explicit) by 3 (Condition: Full knowledge vs. Partial knowledge vs. Ignorance)
ANOVA with Age as a between-subject factor and Task type and Condition as within-subject
factors. Uncertainty gestures were produced more frequently in the informing task than in the
explicit task, F(1, 34) = 15.78, p< .001, η2 = .32. Moreover, the production of the uncertainty
Fig 4. Uncertainty gestures. The mean proportion of trials in which children’s uncertainty gestures were
present as a function of Age (3-year-olds: upper panel; 4-year-olds: lower panel), Condition and Task type.
Error bars indicate standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595.g004
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gestures differed by condition, F(2, 68) = 5.70, p< .01, η2 = .14: production increased linearly
across the three conditions, F (1, 34) = 9.38, p< .01. An interaction of Condition X Age was
also significant, F(2, 68) = 5.70, p< .01, η2 = .14. The simple effect of Age was significant only
for the Ignorance condition (p< .05): 4-year-olds as compared to 3-year-olds produced more
uncertainty gestures in the Ignorance condition. The simple effect of Condition was significant
only among 4-year-olds. More specifically, 4-year-olds’ uncertainty gesture production was
less frequent in the Full knowledge condition as compared to the Partial knowledge condition
or the Ignorance condition (both ps< .001), but it was not significantly different between the
Partial knowledge and the Ignorance condition (p> .05). Three-year-olds did not differ in
their uncertainty gesture production across conditions (all ps> .05). None of the other effects
were significant.
Comparison between the Informing and Explicit tasks
Finally, we compared children’s sensitivity to their own ignorance in the informing task to that
in the explicit task in order to test the gap between the two tasks. We recoded the data in the
following way. The coding in the explicit task followed that of Rohwer et al. [13[. In the Full
Knowledge condition, children received a score of 1 if they correctly reported their own knowl-
edge, and a score of 0 if they did not. In the Ignorance condition and the Partial Knowledge
condition, children received a score of 1 if they acknowledged their ignorance in response to
the test question (“Do you know or do you not know what’s inside the box?”). Children also
received a score of 1 if they erroneously indicated an object name to the test question, but
acknowledged that they were guessing when asked the follow-up question. In the informing
task, in the Full knowledge condition, children received a score of 1 if they agreed to inform
and accurately reported the object identity to Max and a score of 0 if they declined to inform.
In the Partial Knowledge and Ignorance conditions, children received a score of 1 if they
declined to inform or if they agreed to inform but indicated their uncertainty or ignorance
about object identities to Max (e.g., “Hmm,” “I don’t know”). We also coded those responses in
the partial knowledge condition that indicated two possible objects (e.g., “a ball or a car”) as
correct. These responses constituted only a small portion of the data and the results remain the
same if they are excluded.
Fig 5 presents the children’s mean scores as a function of Age, Condition and Task types.
These responses were analyzed with a 2 (Age: 3-year-olds vs. 4-year-olds) by 2 (Task type:
explicit vs. informing) by 3 (Condition: Full knowledge, Partial knowledge, Ignorance)
repeated measures ANOVA with Age as a between-subject factor and Task type and Condition
as within-subject factors. There was a significant main effect of Age F(1, 34) = 5.34, p< .05. η2
= .14. Four-year-olds were more accurate in assessing their knowledge than 3-year-olds. There
was also a significant main effect of Task type F(1, 34) = 5.44, p< .05. η2 = .14, a significant
main effect of Condition F (2, 68) = 4.16, p< .05. η2 = .11, and a significant interaction of Task
type X Condition, F(2, 68) = 7.54, p< .01. η2 = .18.
Inspection of Fig 5 shows that both 3-year-olds (upper panel) and 4-year-olds (lower panel)
performed relatively poorly in the partial knowledge condition but only in the explicit task. To
check these conclusions, the interaction effect was further analyzed by conducting tests of sim-
ple effects. The simple effect of Task type was significant only for the Partial knowledge condi-
tion (p< .0001). Children’s performance did not significantly differ between the two tasks in
either the Full knowledge condition or the Ignorance condition (both ps> .05). For the explicit
task, the simple effect test of Condition revealed that children performed significantly worse in
the Partial Knowledge condition than in the Full knowledge condition (p< .01) or the Igno-
rance condition (p< .0001). For the informing task, the simple effect of Condition was not
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significant for any of the pair-wise comparisons. None of the other main effects or interaction
effects were significant.
Discussion
Young children displayed sensitivity to their own ignorance in their decisions of informing
others. Interestingly, whereas they over-reported their knowledge in the explicit verbal judg-
ment task, when they were asked to inform another person they were more accurate in convey-
ing their ignorance either by declining to inform or by producing gestures of uncertainty.
Below, we discuss the implications of these findings.
Fig 5. Informing and explicit tasks. Themean number of trials in which children provided accurate responses
as a function of Age (3-year-olds: upper panel; 4-year-olds: lower panel), Condition and Task type. Error bars
indicate standard error.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0152595.g005
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The present findings extend prior research on children’s early communication skills. A few
studies have suggested that infants and young children selectively inform another person
depending on the person’s knowledge states ([1–3] but see [32]). However, all these studies
focus on whether children take others' knowledge states into account when informing them.
The current study expands this line of research by demonstrating that children also selectively
inform others depending on their own knowledge states. Children’s propensity to inform oth-
ers is modulated by their own (un)certainty.
According to Harris [5] and Lohmann and Tomasello [6], communication can promote
toddlers’ understanding of their conversational partners as epistemic beings (see also [33]).
Likewise, conversation could allow children to become more gradually aware of their own, vari-
able, epistemic states. Although the present research did not involve a richly interactive con-
text, it is consistent with theoretical proposals that young children’s sensitivity to their own
ignorance may be facilitated in the context of such dialogic communication.
The present findings also provide some novel information to a domain of research on
young children’s metacognitive abilities. By age 4, children are sensitive to the relationship
between perceptual access and knowledge states when they are either given or denied full access
to information (e.g., [10]), but they fail to manifest such sensitivity when given partial access to
information (e.g., [13]), suggesting that the developmental trajectory for monitoring one's own
knowledge and ignorance is gradual. However, there is a reason to believe that children have
some implicit understanding of the relationship between seeing and knowing in a partial expo-
sure task. Various studies suggest that even before children can explicitly verbalize their knowl-
edge states, they can monitor their uncertainty (e.g., [19, 21, 22]) and display different
behaviors concerning items they accurately vs. inaccurately remember or items that are learn-
able vs. unlearnable ([18, 20, 21]). For example, in an opt-out paradigm, in which children are
given the option of declining to answer, they tend to do so when they are uncertain of their
answers—as compared to when they are certain (e.g., [18, 19]). Nevertheless, all these studies
concern children’s uncertainty about either their memory for the items that they previously
learned or were exposed to or their perceptual identification of items presented to them. In one
study, Call and Carpenter did demonstrate that 2.5-year-olds have some implicit understand-
ing of the relationship between seeing and knowing in a partial exposure task [34]. However,
all prior studies, including the study of Call and Carpenter [34], involved a task in which chil-
dren’s own uncertainty might directly guide their own subsequent behaviors and responses.
We extended this line of research by investigating children’s implicit understanding of a
relationship between seeing and knowing in a novel way. We used an informing context in
which children’s own uncertainty or ignorance might impact their communication with others.
Following the rationale of the opt-out paradigm, we allowed children to decline to inform. We
found that children declined to inform another person more often when they did not know
than when they knew which object was in a box.
We also examined children’s production of uncertainty gestures, in light of the proposal
that gestures communicate speakers’ epistemic states and that children’s gestures might indi-
cate an early, implicit sensitivity to their own ignorance. Children’s gestures are a window to
their implicit knowledge of a concept that their verbal responses fail to reveal (e.g., [27]). More-
over, adult listeners understand gestures that mark speakers’ epistemic states as a reliable index
for the speakers’ uncertainty [29] and children as young as 7 years old produce uncertainty ges-
tures and are able to detect them in others [30]. The present findings provide some initial evi-
dence suggesting that young children’s uncertainty gestures display an early indication of
metacognitive abilities. We found that similar to children’s informing decisions children
tended to produce uncertainty gestures more frequently when they did not know the content
of a box than when they did know.
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Interestingly, children’s decisions to agree (as opposed to refusals) to inform decreased line-
arly across the three conditions: the less information they had, the less likely they were to agree
to inform. Moreover, children’s spontaneous production of uncertainty gestures increased line-
arly across the three conditions. Therefore, children experienced uncertainty as a function of
the total amount of information available to them, rather than as a dichotomous Yes-No judg-
ment, as prompted by the experimenter's explicit question. Feelings of knowing, based on the
partial information pertaining to the target that is available to the subject, are not a matter of
all or nothing [16]. Cues such as response latency, coherence of incoming information, and dif-
ficulty in response selection or production have been shown to reliably guide a decision when
they are diagnostic (i.e., when valid and relevant to the task at hand, which seems to be the case
in the informing task); when they are not, they generate illusory feelings of knowing [35] or
illusory judgments of truth [36].
However, these implicit metacognitive decisions do not seem to correlate with children’s
explicit judgments of knowing. In the partial knowledge condition, both children’s decisions to
inform and their metacognitive gestures sharply diverge from their verbal responses. Interest-
ingly, at least among 4-year-olds, uncertainty gestures in the Partial knowledge condition were
produced as frequently as in the Ignorance condition, both of which differed from the Full
knowledge condition. Such a contrast between implicit and explicit metacognitive decisions
has been documented in other studies. For example, Paulus et al. found that 3.5-year-old chil-
dren are able to monitor their memory implicitly (as measured through pupil dilation and fixa-
tion on a Smiley scale), but unable to report confidence judgments about the accuracy of their
responses [22]. Similarly, young children are able to monitor their cognitive processes by
selecting trials depending on difficulty of the trials [18, 20, 21, 31], while unable, at this age, to
form reliable verbal reports about what they know (e.g., [13, 19]). A similar contrast has also
been found in mindreading studies: infants show an early sensitivity to the false beliefs of oth-
ers (e.g., [37]), but it is not until the age of 4 or 5 years that children succeed in explicitly report-
ing a protagonist’s behavior or belief (see [38]).
A common way of framing this contrast consists in emphasizing that language provides
children with concepts of mental states (including knowledge and beliefs). Concept-based rea-
soning might allow children to describe their feelings of confidence in rich inferential terms,
and help them guide their decisions (see [39]). However, although the wording of a question
may invite a concept-based answer, it is not obvious that the concepts that the children under-
stand and use to address the test question are identical to the experimenter's concepts. With
this observation in mind, how can we interpret the contrast in accuracy between implicit and
explicit responses?
A first possibility is to maintain that children have the same understanding of the word
"know” as the experimenter’s, but have executive difficulties in using the mental concepts in
their possession [37]. Alternatively, overattribution of knowledge to themselves in the explicit
metacognitive judgments might be related to their desire to contribute actively and communi-
cate more than they actually know (see [40]). It is plausible that such a desire is heightened
when reporting one's knowledge in an individualistic context rather than informing (and guid-
ing the action of) someone else.
A second possibility is that children do not understand the word "know” exactly as the
experimenter does, and have less differentiated proto-concepts of mental states than adults
[41]. Hence, children might have problems in relating their proto-concept of "know" to their
experienced uncertainty. A problem with this account, however, is that concept-based meta-
cognition, which presumably depends on mature propositional beliefs, does not functionally
replace implicit, experience-based metacognition in adults as it should on this second
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interpretation. Rather, experience-based metacognition remains an option throughout life
[16, 42].
A third possible interpretation is that the contrast between explicit and implicit perfor-
mance is generated by a duality in the sources of epistemic sensitivity. In the informing task,
younger children might have a readily available set of non-conceptual categorical representa-
tions associated with opportunities for action [43–46]. In making a verbal report, by contrast,
they have to focus on the recently acquired, only partially understood concept of "know” (for
further discussion of partially understood concepts: see [47]). The incomplete mastery of this
concept would allow children to reliably respond only in the "full knowledge" and the "igno-
rance" conditions. Future research should address the exact processes respectively involved in
implicit and explicit metacognitive judgments and decisions.
Finally, it is worth noting that in our informing task, in contrast with the explicit task, a
third person was involved; the collaborative nature of the task plausibly increases children’s
motivation for conveying reliable information. As a result, children should tend to monitor
more closely what they did or did not perceive, and hence, should be more sensitive to what
they actually know than in the explicit task, where their motivation might be related to their
own self-concept.
Moreover, our two tasks may differ in their conversational demands. In the informing task,
children were asked to tell someone what the object was in the box: the only type of acceptable
answer, then, is a specific object identity. In the explicit task, in contrast, children could claim
to know without being specific about what they know. This difference in conversational
demands might explain the discrepant findings between the two tasks without requiring meta-
cognitive appraisals. However, different conversational demands do not entail that metacogni-
tive appraisals were not involved in fulfilling these demands (see [46]). Granting that questions
involving specifications require a deeper processing of informativeness than general questions
normally do, an ability to monitor informativeness in one's responses—albeit implicitly—
should be involved in the informing task. Reporting whether one knows or does not know
something, in contrast, does not need to involve in-depth processing of what one knows. Chil-
dren may rather merely monitor the fluency of the alternative answers to respond: the more
fluently accessible answer will be one based on the partial access they have had to the object
type, ignoring the constraint of specifying object identity.
In general, as discussed earlier, social communicative context may facilitate metacognitive
abilities of assessing their own knowledge states. What feature of such contexts (e.g., conversa-
tion, helping context in the informing task), however, facilitated children’s performance is
open to questions and subject to future research. Additionally, although the explicit task fol-
lowed the informing task, the enhanced performance in the informing tasks had no effect on
the explicit task. Future studies may also address possible effects of the informing task on the
explicit task.
The present research adds to the debate about the nature and development of implicit meta-
cognitive abilities and their relationship to concept-based explicit metacognition. Even though
they are not definitive, the present findings suggest that young children are sensitive to their
own ignorance or uncertainty, a vital skill for being a cooperative social partner, and being able
to inform both selectively and reliably.
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